

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 253118

VFOL SECSTATE 253128 SENT ACTION BERLIN MOSCOW NATO OCT. 24  
AND LI REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 253128

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: URN VGE, WTO

SUBJECT: SOVIET-GDR TREATY AIMS AT EXPANDING WARSAW

PAC TREATY OBLIGATIONS

REF: USNATO 5678; STATE 249251

1. FOLLOWING IS INR'S ASSESSMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT ASPECTS  
OF THE SOVIET-GDR TREATY: /

2. THE SIGNING IN MOSCOW ON OCTOBER 7 OF A NEW SOVIET-EAST  
GERMAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION, AND MUTUAL  
ASSISTANCE IS THE LATEST EVIDENCE OF THE USSR'S INTENTION  
TO EXPAND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS WARSAW  
PACT ALLIES. IN EFFECT, THIS BILATEREL TREATY IS TANTAMOUNT  
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TO A PIECEMEAL REVISION OF THE WARSAW PACT TREATY WITHOUT

RECOURSE TO THE PACT'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO DEAL WITH SUCH MATTERS, BST HAS MET ONLY ONCE IN THE LAST THREE YEARS.

3. TREATY ENSHRINES SOVIET PRECEPTS: THE SOVIET-GDR TREATY CONTAINS SEVERAL PROVISIONS KEYED TO THE PROMOTION OF POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WHICH GO BEYOND THE 1955 WARSAW PACT TREATY. THEY GIVE SUBSTANCE TO GROMYKO(S EXHORTATION OF LAST MAY FOR "CONTINUAL

PERFECTION" IN COORDINATING THE FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENSE, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF PACT MEMBERS. THESE PROVISIONS

(A)--INCORPORATE THE SO-CALLED BREZHNEV DOCTRINE BY BINDING SIGNATORIES TO PROTECT AND DEFEND SOCIALIST ACHIEVEMENTS;

(B)--EMBODY THE CSCE PRINCIPLE ON THE INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS AND STRESS THE DETERMINATION OF THE USSR AND THE GDR, JOINTLY AND IN ALLIANCE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PACT, TO GUARANTEE THE BORDERS OF PACT STATES AS ESTABLISHED AFTER WORLD WAR II, INCLUDING THE BORDER BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE FRG;

(C)--CALL FOR IMMEDIATE MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY EITHER PARTY IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK FROM ANY QUARTER; AND

(D)--EMPHASIZE THE EXPANSION OF MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND AIMS OF SOCIALIST INTEGRATION.

4. BILATERAL TREATIES TAKING PRECEDENCE OVER WARSAW PACT TREATY. THE MUTUAL DEFENSE PROVISION OF THE SOVIET-GDR TREATY IS BROADER THAN THOSE CONTAINED IN EITHER ITS 1964 PREDECESSOR TREATY OR THE 1955 WARSAW PACT TREATY. LIKE SEVERAL OTHER SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN TREATIES, IT APPEARS TO OBLIGATE THE GDR TO ASSIST THE SOVIET UNION IN  
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DEFENDING ITS NON-EUROPEAN FRONTIERS.

5. THE WARSAW PACT TREATY WAS AIMED AT "ENSURING PEACE IN EUROPE," AND AT PREVENTING THE REBIRTH OF "MILITARISM AND REVANCHISM." IT CALLED FOR AN OFFER OF SUCH IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE AS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY BY THE ALLY IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK "IN EUROPE." IN VIEW OF THE GROWING CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA, THE SOVIETS IN THE

LATE 1960'S RENEWED THEIR NEARLY TWO-DECADE OLD BILATERAL DEFENSE TREATIES WITH EAST EUROPEAN STATES AND SEEMINGLY BROADENED THE MUTUAL DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS OF PACT MEMBERS BY DELETING THE RESTRICTIVE PHRASE "IN EUROPE" FROM ALL BUT TWO OF THESE TREATIES.

6. THE NEW MUTUAL DEFENSE PROVISION OF THE SOVIET-GDR TREATY, ARTICLE 8, READS: "IN THE CASE OF AN ARMED ATTACK BY ANY STATE OR GROUP OF STATES ON ONE OF THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES THE OTHER HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY

WILL REGARD THIS AS AN ATTACK ON ITSELF AND IMMEDIATELY GIVE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE...." THIS FORMULATION IS CONSISTENT WITH SIMILAR PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE USSR'S 1967 BILATERAL DEFENSE TREATIES WITH BULGARIA AND HUNGARY AND THE 1970 TREATY WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ALL OF THOSE OBLIGATE THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO "IMMEDIATELY RENDER EVERY AID" TO THE PARTY ATTACKED BY "ANY STATE OR GROUP OF STATES."

7. THE 1965 SOVIET-POLISH DEFENSE TREATY DOES NOT FIT THIS NEW PATTERN, AND IT MAY BE THE NEXT TARGET FOR REVISION. IT CALLS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO AN ATTACK ON ONE OF THE PARTIES BY "WEST GERMAN MILITARIST AND REVANCHIST FORCES OR....ANY COUNTRY WHICH WOULD JOIN THEM."

8. ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1970 SOVIET-ROMANIAN TREATY CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO AN ATTACK BY "ANY STATE OR ONE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES. ARTICLE 9, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO MAKE THIS ASSISTANCE CONTINGENT ON THE OUTCOME OF CONSULTATIONS TO BE HELD SO THAT THE PARTIES "AGREE ABOUT THEIR POSITIONS" ON ALL IMPORTANT

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INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. THE TREATY ALSO AVOIDS CHARACTERIZING AN ARMED ATTACK ON THE OTHER PARTY AS AN ATTACK AGAINST ITSELF.

9. WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET-GDR TREATY'S PROVISION DEALING WITH THE INVIOABILITY OF EUROPEAN FRONTIERS, THE TREATY CALLS UPON THE USSR AND THE GDR, "JOINTLY AND IN ALLIANCE WITH" OTHER PACT MEMBERS, "TO GUARANTEE THE INVIOABILITY OF THE BORDERS OF MEMBER STATES" OF THE QUADRANTAL PACT "WHICH HAVE EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF WORLD WAR II AND OF POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING THE BORDERS BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE FRG." IT IS NOT KNOWN IF OTHER PACT MEMBERS WERE CONSULTED ON THIS COMMITMENT, BUT THE PROVISION IS ESSENTIALLY CONSISTENT WITH SIMILAR

PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE GDR'S BILATERAL TREATIES WITH OTHER PACT STATES.

10. BROADENED DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS LARGELY POLITICAL: WHILE THE SOVIET-GDR TREATY CLAIMS THAT ITS PROVISIONS ARE NOT AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE CONTAINED IN THE WARSAW PACT TREATY, ITS MUTUAL DEFENSE PROVISIONS ARE BROADER AND ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO VARYING INTERPRETATIONS. THE TREATY DOES CONTAIN SAVING CLAUSES WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO ASSUAGE THE ANXIETIES OF PACT MEMBERS CONCERNING THEIR POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENDING THE

SOVIET UNION'S FRONTIERS WITH CHINA. THE TREATY CALLS FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM THE WARSAW PACT TREATY AND THE RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER.

11. IF THE SOVIETS EVER TRIED TO INVOKE THE MUTUAL DEFENSE PROVISIONS OF THE BILATERAL DEFENSE TREATIES FOR PURPOSES OF DEFENDING THEIR NON-EUROPEAN BORDERS, THESE SAVING CLAUSES COULD OFFER SOME PACT MEMBERS GROUNDS FOR FOOT-DRAGGING. HOWEVER, SINCE IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD ACTUALLY WANT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES OUTSIDE EUROPE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH BROAD DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS WOULD APPEAR--AT LEAST AT THE MOMENT--TO BE LARGELY SYMBOLIC AND POLITICAL.

12. A HARBINGER OF THINGS TO COME: THE SOVIET BILATERAL TREATIES WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR ARE THE ONLY ONES SO FAR TO EMBODY THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, WHICH, AS INCORPORATED IN ARTICLE 4 OF THE SOVIET-GDR TREATY, READS: "THEY (THE CONTRACTING PARTIES) DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT AND DEFEND THE HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIALISM AND THE SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE TWO COUNTRIES."

13. IN THE CURRENT POST-CSCE PERIOD THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO PRESS FOR SIMILAR LANGUAGE IN THEIR EXISTING TREATIES WITH THE REMAINING PACT STATES, AS WELL AS FOR AN UPDATING OF BILATERAL DEFENSE TREATIES BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL PACT MEMBERS. AS A LOGICAL FINAL STEP, THE SOVIETS MAY WELL SEEK TO BRING THE WARSAW PACT TREATY INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE UPDATED BILATERALS. AS IT IS, THE ANTI-GERMAN FOCUS OF THE ORIGINAL TREATY CONFLICTS

WITH THE SUBSEQUENT OSTPOLITIK TREATIES.

14. THAT FURTHER UPDATINGS MIGHT BE HIGH ON THE SOVIETS' AGENDA WAS SUGGESTED IN AN ARTICLE IN THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF KOMMUNIST, WHICH QUOTED GROMYKO AS HAVING STATED THAT "THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING UNITY AND FIRMNESS, THE DEFENSIVE POWER OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY, WILL REMAIN A FIRST-RANK CONCERN OF THE CPSU AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE...." GROMYKO ALSO HINTED AT THE PROBABILITY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO BYPASS THE WARSAW PACT'S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE IN UPDATING THEIR CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS. WHILE ADMITTING THE VALUE OF THAT COMMITTEE, HE EMPHASIZED THAT "THERE ARE ALSO OTHER FORMS

OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS...WHICH...PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE" IN STRENGTHENING SOCIALIST UNITY.

15. BY CHOOSING THE BILATERAL ROUTE THE SOVIETS CAN AVOID THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING UNANIMITY IN THE POLITICAL CONFIDENTIAL

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CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE INCORPORATION OF SOVIET PRECEPTS, PARTICULARLY THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO ROMANIA. THEY MAY HAVE DECIDED ALSO NOT TO TAMPER FOR THE TIME BEING WITH THE PACT

TREATY; IT AFFORDS THEM A FRAMEWORK FOR THE PACT'S MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, AND THE BILATERAL TREATIES PROVIDE THE MEANS FOR THE SOVIETS TO EXERCISE CONTROL. INGERSOLL UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

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